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Abstract 
A 2008 multistate foodborne outbreak of Salmonella Saintpaul caused more than 1,400 illnesses 
in the United States (U.S.).  Although initial investigations suggested tomatoes as the potential 
vehicle, jalapeño and serrano peppers were subsequently found positive for the outbreak strain.  
The uncertainty associated with this incident caused government, industry, and the public to 
question the efficacy of the U.S. food safety system.  Examination of the response to this 
incident exposed breakdowns in several areas.  Communication at all levels was lacking, leading 
to an absence of coordinated actions and conflicting risk communication messages.  Variations in 
resources between local and state health departments created delays in gathering accurate 
information for epidemiological investigations.  Although new laws required increased 
documentation, rapid and thorough traceback of produce products remained elusive.  Three 
factors contributed to the difficulty in the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak, including (1) delayed 
response due to discrepancies in available resources and expertise at state and local levels, (2) 
inadequate communication between stakeholders and agencies, and (3) poor traceability 
capabilities.  Future responses to foodborne illness outbreaks may be improved by addressing 
these three factors. 
Keywords: food safety, produce, outbreak, Salmonella, Salmonella Saintpaul 
Introduction, Research Questions, and Methodology 
On May 22, 2008, the United States (U.S.) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) was notified by the New Mexico Department of Health of four people infected with the 
same strain of Salmonella—an unusual serotype, Salmonella Saintpaul.  Three months later, a 
total of 1,442 cases from 43 states, the District of Columbia and Canada were reported.  
Meanwhile, consumer confidence in the safety of the food supply waned 1.  This outbreak 
focused attention on the current system for investigation and regulation of foodborne diseases 
and illuminated gaps in the U.S. federal government’s ability to quickly and accurately trace 
potentially contaminated food vehicles back to their source.  Some people claimed the U.S. food 
safety system worked as it should and cited the isolation of a matching strain of Salmonella 
Saintpaul from a jalapeño pepper in Texas and additional positive samples found on the 
suspected farm of origin in Mexico.  However, others felt the current system for multi-state 
outbreak response and investigation failed and needs to be fixed 2.   
Thought leaders in food safety regulation agreed that the outbreak and subsequent 
investigation posed a unique level of complexity (and difficulty) rarely witnessed in public 
health response.  However, these same leaders debate the source of the complexity.  Some 
maintain the investigation represents an atypical incident 3, 4 for several reasons.   First, most 
outbreaks involve one food vehicle, whereas at least two food products were contaminated with 
the outbreak strain of Salmonella Saintpaul in this incident.  Also, neither raw jalapeño nor raw 
serrano peppers had been previously associated with Salmonella contamination, and little 
information was available regarding growth rates or survival times at the onset of this outbreak 8.  
These foods are often used in small quantities as garnishes or combined with other foods and 
cases might be unaware of consuming these “stealth vehicles.”  In the outbreak, epidemiologic 
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analysis was complicated by the lack of large, identified clusters early in the investigation.  In the 
initial weeks of the outbreak, most “clusters” consisted of 2-3 cases—numbers too small to 
determine statistical significance between foods consumed in cases versus geographically 
matched controls, or created marked variations in calculated odds ratios of food items between 
clusters, leading to some uncertainty in which foods were most likely to be associated with 
illness 10-12.  A further complication in the statistical analyses was that tomatoes and jalapeño or 
serrano peppers were often consumed together, creating a strong, collinear relationship that 
increased the difficulty in determining a numerical value for statistical significance of these 
foods individually 8.  
While many feel this outbreak was an anomaly, others point to the investigation’s 
cumbersome intricacy as evidence of a fundamentally flawed food safety system 2.  This paper 
will not, and does not seek to, resolve this disagreement; instead, it seeks to address another 
question, the answer to which will help inform the debate: 
What factors most affected the difficulty experienced during the Salmonella Saintpaul 
outbreak and subsequent investigation, and are these factors representative of larger 
problems in the food system? 
Data for this paper were gathered from a wide range of stakeholders, including 
government employees of state and federal public health and food safety agencies, industry and 
consumer representatives, and state and national legislators (see Table 1).  In the wake of this 
outbreak, Congress summoned principal participants for testimonies before the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committees on Agriculture (Subcommittee on Horticulture and Organic 
Agriculture), Energy and Commerce (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation), and 
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Appropriations (Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug 
Administration and Related Agencies); the bulk of information is drawn from public testimony 
delivered before these groups.  Additional data regarding the outbreak investigation were 
gathered from CDC and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) bulletins and reports; much of 
this is summarized in Table 2.  Relevant publications from several non-governmental entities 
were also consulted. 
This paper—an exploration of a treasure trove of emerging literature regarding a recent 
food safety incident—draws on an inductive, yet systematic, research approach.  Inductive 
analysis involves the gathering of data from which observations are extracted.  While many view 
traditional, deductive methods as superior to inductive methods, a number of scholars maintain 
inductive research is a legitimate approach to numerous problems, particularly in the field of 
social science 5.  The research presented in this paper relies on methods that are highly inductive 
in nature; in this inductive analysis, the authors explored the range of literature regarding the 
Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak and identified specific factors that contributed to the outbreak’s 
complexity.  The modern food system is multifaceted and complex, with government, industry, 
and the public playing significant roles6.  Therefore, it is good and appropriate to analyze 
multiple perspectives from these groups in order to formulate ideas which best reflect the 
concerns and challenges of all stakeholders.  Some of these perspectives (e.g., Congressional 
testimony) represent individual experts’ opinions, but the authors accept this limitation in their 
overall effort to acquire multiple viewpoints.  Specifically, through an inductive review of 
government, industry, and consumer reports (see Table 1) as well as multidisciplinary analyses, 
this study inductively proposes three factors within the current food safety system that greatly 
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contribute to the complexity of foodborne disease outbreaks, as evidenced by the Salmonella 
Saintpaul investigation.  These three factors form the framework in the results section. 
Results 
Three factors emerged as the key elements which most increased the complexity of and 
difficulty experienced during the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak.  These included (1) delayed 
response due to discrepancies in resources and expertise at state and local levels, (2) inadequate 
communication between stakeholders and agencies, and (3) poor traceability capabilities.   
Factor 1: Delayed response due to variability in resources and expertise at state and local 
levels 
In a typical foodborne illness outbreak, clusters of cases are identified by local or state 
public health departments, which may solicit aid from the CDC in the form of Epi-Aid teams, 
usually consisting of epidemiologists, public health specialists, and Epidemic Intelligence 
Service (EIS) officers.  The primary role of the CDC, which often relies on data provided by 
state and local personnel, is to identify potential food vehicles of infection in order to prevent 
further illnesses.  Once a food item has been implicated (either through epidemiological or 
microbiological evidence), the FDA or the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is notified in 
order to pursue further investigation and possible regulatory action.  Once the regulatory agency 
(USDA or FDA) has been notified, tracing the food back to the source of contamination begins.  
Historically, the FDA has relied on voluntary product recalls from companies, while the USDA 
has enjoyed more authority to recall contaminated products. 
The current food safety system relies on coordinated efforts between local, state, and 
federal agencies with opportunities for discrepancies in speed of response at several levels.  The 
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speed of involvement of the CDC is highly dependent on how quickly the local or state 
government decides additional assistance is needed and submits a request for the same.  There is 
great variability in available resources and expertise at state and local levels, which can influence 
both the speed with which local officials are able to respond to potential cases and request 
federal assistance.  The success of national surveillance systems is highly dependent on the 
effectiveness of state and local public health systems 14; therefore, the availability of resources at 
the state and local level can greatly influence the responsiveness of the federal government to 
potential outbreak situations.  According to the Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak 
Response (CIFOR), the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak highlighted serious deficiencies in the 
current foodborne disease surveillance system and initial epidemiological investigations 15.  
Since CDC involvement is dependent on invitations from states, actual CDC support may be 
delayed.  In the Salmonella Saintpaul investigation, the CDC was not formally invited to step 
into a coordinating role until June 3 (see Table 2).  CDC personnel were not deployed into the 
field to actively participate in data collection until June 18.  The inability of the CDC to act 
independently without the invitation of states limits the amount of federal resources applied 
towards epidemiological investigations. 
While some state and local public health departments are well-funded and able to carry 
out foodborne disease outbreak investigations quickly and efficiently, many others lack adequate 
resources which can negatively impact investigations in several ways.  The advent of PulseNet, a 
centralized databank of PFGE patterns for six foodborne pathogens of interest, including 
Campylobacter, Salmonella, and Escherichia coli O157:H7, has markedly increased the 
surveillance capabilities of the public health system.  In 2005, public health laboratories 
uploaded more than 30,000 Salmonella patterns, resulting in the recognition of 152 multistate 
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Salmonella clusters 15.  The Minnesota Department of Public Health, recognized as one of the 
premiere public health agencies in the nation, has the ability to characterize and enter isolates 
into PulseNet within 3 days.  In the outbreak of Salmonella Saintpaul, however, the nationwide 
median time from onset of illness until PFGE pattern was entered into PulseNet was 17 days, 
with some states taking more than 27 days 8.  These delays may be due to multiple causes, 
including substantial backlogs of samples, insufficient personnel, and inadequate laboratory 
equipment.   Indeed, many state and local laboratories lack the necessary equipment for “real-
time” testing, leading to significant delays between onset of illness and identification of a 
pathogen 14, 15.  In the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak, Texas experienced a critical delay in 
identification of cases, which led to several restaurant-associated clusters (necessary for case-
control studies) going unrecognized for a prolonged period.   
Shortages in state and local resources and expertise were magnified by the fact that 
Salmonella Saintpaul is a relatively rare serotype with an estimated annual occurrence of 400 
cases per year across the U.S. compared to serotypes such as S. Typhimurium or S. Enteritidis, 
which normally cause more than 1,000 cases per year 4, 13.  Many laboratories may not have the 
supplies and reagents available to test these more uncommon serotypes.  Federal agencies will 
continue to struggle to identify contaminated food products unless all state and local public 
health laboratories are brought up to minimum standards.  This has led to requests for funding by 
A.G. Kawamura, Secretary of the California Department of Food and Agriculture, to implement 
a uniform system for reporting and investigations of outbreaks in all states 7.  In July 2008, then 
Senator Barack Obama proposed a bill to increase state and local resources for surveillance and 
investigation activities by $25,000,000 a year for three years.  While these are steps in the right 
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direction, more needs to be done to promote capacity building for the investigation, control, and 
prevention of foodborne disease19. 
Factor 2: Inadequate Communication Between Agencies and Stakeholders  
A key concern in any epidemiological investigation, and one that has come under close 
scrutiny in this outbreak, is establishing and maintaining communication among governmental 
agencies and various stakeholders in order to quickly and efficiently trace food vehicles back to 
the source of contamination and remove affected products from the marketplace to prevent 
further illnesses.  Both the FDA and the CDC have come under heavy fire from government and 
industry leaders for their perceived failure to communicate both with each other and with the 
tomato industry18.  
In order to accomplish these goals, the CDC works closely with state public health 
authorities to identify outbreaks, determine common exposures, and ascertain the potential 
number of individuals affected or at risk.  In states with highly autonomous local health 
departments, information sharing through the state to the CDC may not occur.  Currently, in 50 
states there are more than 3,000 local health departments 16.  In some states, such as Minnesota, 
the public health system is highly centralized with decision making authority lying with the state, 
whereas many other states are highly decentralized with the local public health officials holding 
more authority than the state in regards to cases in their area.  In approximately 50% of states, 
local public health officials are responsible for conducting case interviews for foodborne disease, 
in addition to a myriad of other duties and issues—including, but not limited to, programs for 
immunizations, sexually transmitted diseases, and birth defects 15.  In these areas, interviews of 
cases to determine potential food vehicles may not occur for several weeks after the illness, 
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leading to the possibility of inaccuracies in recall and obscuring of epidemiological relationships 
17.  Unreasonably long delays in receiving information from potential cases, as well as 
complications arising from differing questionnaires administered by multiple individuals within a 
single outbreak or area, may also occur 2.  Since the CDC has relationships predominantly with 
states, local agencies conducting the actual investigations are often unable to easily access the 
valuable resources the CDC can provide.  
While the FDA also collects epidemiologic information during a foodborne outbreak, its 
priority is to trace the implicated food vehicle back to the source, determine contributing factors 
leading to the contamination, and work with regulated industries to minimize the likelihood of 
similar circumstances recurring in the future.  FDA has the responsibility to take regulatory 
action to prevent more contaminated foodstuffs from entering the food supply through voluntary 
recalls, and to collect evidence that may be used to pursue punitive measures.  Since information 
they collect may be used in legal action against individuals or organizations, it must be able to 
meet high evidentiary standards.  This greatly curtails the FDA’s ability to solicit information or 
expert opinions from individuals in industry, whose companies might or might not become 
involved as the investigation progresses.  Additionally, the FDA is very limited in the amount of 
information they can share with outside groups due to federal regulations regarding “trade 
secrets” and other proprietary information 16.  In the case of Salmonella Saintpaul, this led to 
much dissatisfaction on the part of the tomato industry, whose members felt excluded from 
offering vital information which would have absolved U.S. tomatoes as the source of 
contamination—and potentially saved the U.S. tomato industry millions of dollars in lost revenue 
20.  Similarly, the FDA also has been criticized for restricting the amount of information it shares 
with state officials, limiting the effectiveness of aid provided by the states.  In particular, state 
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officials in Florida, one of the states most affected by the FDA consumer advisory regarding 
Roma and red round tomatoes, felt that FDA should have requested information from states 
regarding the stage of production of their tomato growers, thereby allowing the FDA to eliminate 
most states in a timely fashion instead of the broad consumer advisory which was kept in place 
until July 17, 2008 18.   
Several industry stakeholders who were impacted by the Salmonella Saintpaul 
investigation recommend that measures be taken to foster communication between industry and 
federal agencies, particularly the FDA 20-22.  Reginald Brown, Executive Vice President of the 
Florida Tomato Exchange, called for the creation of standing “consulting committees,” which 
could be integrated into the management of future outbreaks 20.  The creation of communication 
channels with established experts in both industry and academic circles would provide a level of 
expertise in commodities that the FDA, under current budget limitations, frankly cannot afford.  
Others have proposed similar mechanisms to facilitate information sharing 2, 23.  While Mr. 
Brown acknowledges concerns on the part of the FDA in regards to confidentiality and conflict 
of interest on the part of industry committee members, he has not offered specific solutions for 
this dilemma 20.   
In addition to a lack of communication among other groups, information sharing between 
FDA and CDC was slow, particularly at the beginning of the outbreak.  A frustration from the 
perspective of state personnel was the lack of uniformity in messages coming from the federal 
agencies, specifically the reluctance of the FDA to share information as completely as did the 
CDC18.  This disparity reflects a need of the FDA and CDC to coordinate and collaborate on the 
information released to partner agencies in order that all participants are equally informed, and 
messaging is consistent and comprehensive.  However, in the midst of much criticism, one 
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benefit did arise from the protracted Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak.  For the first time in recent 
history, CDC sent several epidemiologists to work with the FDA on the epidemiologic 
investigation for product traceback.  This partnership allowed exchanges of information and 
ideas, and may serve as a collaborative model for future foodborne disease outbreak response. 
Currently, the U.S. food safety system is guided by 35 individual food safety laws, 
overseen by 14 separate federal entities.  This fractured authority among multiple agencies has 
been blamed by many as the underlying problem within the current system2.  In order to facilitate 
better communication among federal agencies in regards to foodborne illnesses, both Senator 
Richard Durbin and Representative Rosa DeLauro have introduced Congressional bills to 
combine FDA and CDC into a single agency under the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS).  In the wake of the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak and subsequent accusations 
of poor coordination and communication between agencies, Congresswoman DeLauro has 
announced plans to again sponsor legislation that would call for a reorganization of the FDA into 
a Food Safety Administration and a Federal Drug and Device Administration, both within HHS.  
Response to such large scale reordering of the food safety system has been mixed, with concerns 
on many sides.  However, according to one former USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service 
administrator, Professor Mike Taylor of Georgetown University, “Over the long run, [such] 
unification under a modern statutory mandate is the only way to make cost-effective use of the 
resources the federal government invests in food safety.”17 
Communication of risks to the American public also needs to be improved, according to 
representatives from several groups including the National Restaurant Association, Western 
Growers, and the Center for Science in the Public Interest 1, 21, 24.  The World Health 
Organization defines risk communication as “an interactive process of exchange of information 
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and opinion among individuals, groups and institutions.”25.  This exchange of information should 
lead to appropriate behavioral changes by American consumers.  A unified voice, displaying a 
considered assessment of risk and communication of accurate facts, is key to successful 
communications during a public health emergency26.  A study to develop recommendations for 
effective risk communication in regards to foodborne illnesses has been proposed2; guidelines for 
effective communication are available from several international agencies 27, 28.  More attention 
to appropriate risk communication on the part of the government should boost the frequency of 
desirable responses on the part of the American public as well as increase the spirit of 
cooperation between government and industry. 
Factor 3: Poor Traceability Capabilities 
In any epidemiological investigation, the ability to quickly and accurately trace a product 
back to its source is crucial to successful isolation of the pathogen.  The Public Health Security 
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Bioterrorism Act) mandated new 
traceback requirements; however, during the Salmonella Saintpaul investigation, the FDA 
encountered significant difficulties in the traceback of tomatoes.  A report conducted by HHS’s 
Office of Inspector General found similar problems, with only 5 of 40 food products successfully 
traced throughout the entire chain of distribution.  Reasons cited for this lack of traceability 
included lack of lot-specific labeling and mixing of products from multiple sources.  In addition, 
25% of facilities involved were unaware of recordkeeping requirements 29.   This highlights the 
need for better traceability systems in produce30-32. 
Several common practices in the tomato industry exacerbate the traceability problem.  
Tomatoes are routinely packed and repacked at several stages of production to assure uniformity 
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of the product and are often sold individually; this commingling makes it difficult to trace the 
product all the way back to the farm of origin (while dramatically increasing the number of items 
that might potentially come into contact with the suspected pathogen)3.  Another problem 
encountered by the FDA arose from the diversity of records received.  At different stages of 
production, terminology for tomatoes may differ so that tomatoes listed as “hothouse” tomatoes 
by one party may be termed “tomato bulk” on the next bill of lading.  The changes in 
nomenclature for produce at different steps in the supply chain, as well as the lack of consistently 
recorded information, increased the time required to follow the implicated tomatoes through 
distribution channels.  In addition, tomatoes are perishable commodities, so by the time an illness 
was reported, the suspected item was no longer available for testing and similar items from the 
same location had also exited the food chain.  This prevented testing of the implicated products 
for possible contamination and is a reasonable explanation for the inability to isolate the outbreak 
strain from tomatoes.   
In the wake of the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak, several in the tomato industry have 
called for comprehensive traceability standards for all parties involved in growing and marketing 
tomatoes20, 32.  Based on the high risk of contamination, many groups within the tomato industry 
have been proactive in creating guidelines for Good Agricultural Practices specifically for 
tomatoes (T-GAPs), and instituting rapid, complete traceback systems.  A number of businesses 
are able to trace their tomatoes from the distributor back to (a) the field in which they were 
produced and (b) the crew that harvested them 24, 31.  With the use of available software, some 
vertically integrated companies can use invoice numbers provided by the customer to trace 
products back within a few minutes, as well as determine where other tomatoes from the source 
were sent32.  In mock recall exercises by the California Tomato Farmers organization, 
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participants were able to determine the origin of contaminated tomatoes, including location of 
the field, grower, harvest date, pack date, shipping date and transportation carrier, within 35 
minutes31.  As demonstrated by these examples, rapid traceback of tomatoes is possible with 
current technology—provided firms are willing to make the investment.  According to one 
California company, these extra costs involved in the safe production of their product are just the 
price of doing business in today’s market32.  However, when the FDA issued a nationwide 
consumer advisory, all tomato growers, including those spending large amounts of money to 
implement rapid traceability programs, were affected.  As Dr. James Gorny, Executive Director 
of Postharvest Technology Research and Information Center at the University of California, 
Davis stated in regard to the consumer advisory issued by FDA for tomatoes, “It is a huge 
disincentive for private enterprises to invest in robust food safety programs and traceability 
systems, if they offer no protection against industry wide shut downs by broad public health 
advisories.23”  During the Salmonella Saintpaul investigation, Florida—the industry leader in the 
design and implementation of regulations to reduce risk in tomatoes—was the last tomato-
producing area in the U.S. to be cleared by the FDA20 and sustained economic losses estimated at 
$100 million 26.  In order for organizations and states (e.g., Florida) within the tomato industry to 
benefit from the time and money invested in establishing and adhering to these stringent 
guidelines, all participants must operate at this high level of record keeping and good agricultural 
practices. 
The 2002 Bioterrorism Act was designed to address many of these concerns; however, 
based on the recent investigation, there are severe shortcomings in this piece of legislation.  
While the Bioterrorism Act requires packers, wholesalers, and distributors to keep traceability-
related records for all high-risk produce in the supply chain, it does not mandate electronic 
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recordkeeping.  In addition, one expert has noted that farms, restaurants, and foreign firms are 
exempted from these recordkeeping requirements33.  These omissions leave a significant gap in 
the chain of custody of produce between the farm and the consumer, while the lack of mandatory 
electronic record keeping creates chaotic amounts of paperwork that must be examined.  Another 
failure in the Bioterrorism Act is that the authority to ensure compliance with recordkeeping 
standards and to seize records during a foodborne outbreak is not explicitly given to the FDA or 
any other federal agency 33.  In the recent outbreak, FDA had to wait up to 24 hours for 
companies to supply the requested information and records were sometimes incomplete.  This 
contributed to the delay in tracing the source of implicated tomatoes, at a time when ten or more 
people a day might become ill.  For firms that fail to comply with the recordkeeping regulations, 
the FDA can bring only minimal punitive actions, which arguably reduces the incentive to 
companies to institute and maintain acceptable recordkeeping procedures.  The 2002 
Bioterrorism Act was crafted with a view to minimize the burden of traceability placed on small 
producers; however, the projected costs of $140 million a year for more stringent requirements 
ought to be compared to the larger losses recently sustained by the tomato industry, due in large 
part to poor traceability industry-wide 33.   
Due to concerns with traceability of produce, both industry and government have been 
attempting to standardize information among all participants.  The Produce Marketing 
Association, in conjunction with Canadian Produce Marketing Association and United Fresh 
Produce Association, created a Traceability Initiative Steering Committee to establish standards 
for uniform methods to maintain vital information.  These requirements include use of (a) a 
Global Trade Item Number (GTIN) to identify the manufacturer and type of produce, (b) lot 
number, and (c) harvest or pack date.  This information would be visibly displayed as well as 
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encoded into a barcode that could be scanned by each party and electronic records kept by all 
involved.  This initiative relies on key information being maintained throughout the supply chain 
and the consistent use of electronic records34.  A recent Associated Press-Ipsos poll reported 86% 
of consumers support traceability30.  This call for better traceability standards industry-wide has 
been heard by Congress and several bills addressing improved traceability and food safety have 
been introduced 1, 35, 36, 19.   
Some worry that the costs of raising traceability standards will drive smaller producers 
out of business; however, the impact of Salmonella Saintpaul on the tomato industry illustrates 
the price of not having uniform, highly efficient traceability programs in place.  Setting 
mandatory standards for produce traceability across the industry is an important step in the 
improved protection of the food supply and the prevention of future problems.  Improved 
traceability is one important measure needed to significantly overhaul the food safety system and 
minimize the risk of foodborne illness30. 
Discussion 
In the aftermath of the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak, numerous agencies and individuals 
have scrutinized each step in the investigation in order to better prepare for future outbreaks in 
other commodity areas.  Close examination of the decisions made and actions taken from 
multiple points of view demonstrate that foodborne illness outbreaks, and this one in particular, 
are not simple, black-and-white episodes.  In any investigation of this sort, many stakeholders, 
often with opposing goals or directives, are involved.  While everyone agrees that the safety of 
the public health is paramount, the best way to achieve this goal is often debated.  Regardless of 
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personal opinions or perspectives, there are many lessons that can be learned from a thorough 
evaluation of the recent outbreak and investigation. 
In retrospect, the most important lesson learned by all parties should be that government 
cannot continue to function with the current amount of resources; there is a marked need for 
more funding—especially at state and local levels—for foodborne surveillance and investigation.  
This outbreak has revealed that the effectiveness of federal surveillance and outbreak 
investigations hinge on the ability of the local and state public health systems to rapidly and 
efficiently identify the causative pathogen and gather information from ill individuals.  To do 
this, many states will need additional resources.  The FDA has recently requested applications 
for the establishment of Food Protection Rapid Response Teams in six states to investigate multi-
state outbreaks of foodborne illness 9, but this is insufficient to meet the demands of the entire 
nation.  Each year, the FDA decreases the number of food safety inspections due to budgetary 
restraints and more money is needed for research to improve pathogen reduction or prevention 
methods in all food sources.  For the FDA alone, the Science Board of Trust for America’s 
Health recommends an increase of $450 million dollars over the next five years37.  To safeguard 
public health, the U.S. government must make new investments for resource-building activities 
at local, state, and federal levels. 
In addition to increased financial resources, more planning and cooperation needs to take 
place among involved agencies and other stakeholders during non-crises periods.  Many of the 
problems encountered during the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak could have been minimized or 
eliminated by appropriate pre-planning.  Memorandums of understanding among FDA, CDC, 
state public health agencies and state departments of agriculture need to be implemented to 
establish roles and responsibilities of governmental agencies in response to foodborne illness in 
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order to maximize cooperation18.  Similar agreements are also necessary among states to 
facilitate sharing of resources, especially in regards to laboratory tools or personnel, in cases 
where public health capacities of individual states are overwhelmed.  The past outbreak has 
shown the importance of soliciting expertise from outside sources, either academic or industrial.  
These external committees need to be formed, the roles clearly defined and participants carefully 
selected before an outbreak occurs in order to be an effective source of information in times of 
crises.  As demonstrated by the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak, preparation needs to occur before 
outbreaks take place, not in the midst of them.  To effectively use limited resources as wisely as 
possible, local, state and federal authorities must plan ahead and design ways to work with each 
other as well as industry and academia to protect the health of the public.     
In addition, the federal government needs to reassess the degree of information federal 
agencies can share with outside experts in order for sufficient information exchange to occur.  
The FDA, and other federal regulatory agencies, must be able to share information with partners 
in a timely and comprehensive manner in order to protect the nation’s public health 16.    
The highly collinear relationship between tomatoes and jalapeño and serrano peppers (all 
of which were, at various times, suspected during the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak) obfuscated 
statistical associations between these items and illnesses, and posed a special challenge in the 
investigation.  Since the precedent has now been set that “stealth vehicles” can cause large 
numbers of illnesses, epidemiologists may need to include additional items that are often served 
together in case-control studies even if there is not a strong statistical association in initial 
analyses.  This outbreak also has illustrated the need for more data-collection and investigation-
methods consistency among local and state agencies; establishing universal case questionnaires 
and uniform reporting requirements for common foodborne pathogens would help to ensure 
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incoming information in a multi-state outbreak is comparable.  Undoubtedly, one of the most 
important tools needed for better investigations in the future, is a standardized traceback system 
that allows produce to be efficiently followed from the end consumer back to the grower for 
rapid identification of the source of contamination.  In order to achieve this, regulations must be 
implemented to require a minimum amount of information be included in electronic records kept 
by all parties involved in the supply chain, including those businesses selling directly to the 
consumer such as restaurants and grocery stores.  To allow for the degree of traceability 
demanded by the public, items need to be clearly marked and records need to be kept at the 
individual or package level so items retrieved from consumers can be traced back.  As 
demonstrated in the recent Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak, information at the lot level for 
tomatoes is not useful if consumers buy one or two tomatoes from a chain grocery store that may 
have multiple lots available at any time; in order to trace produce commonly sold individually, 
each item needs to have identifying information and all records need to be kept in electronic 
format for quick access.  In order to improve the speed of response for the next foodborne 
outbreak and minimize the number of people affected, these topics need to be addressed to 
ensure that current knowledge and technology are fully exploited. 
While some of these concerns were obvious before the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak, 
their importance has since become indisputable.  For some of these, change will be difficult and 
require cooperative efforts from many sources; some may not have clear-cut answers.  However, 
in order to increase the effectiveness of the food safety system, these issues must be addressed.  
Only by increasing financial resources, improving cooperation and information-sharing among 
stakeholders, evaluating current methodologies, and implementing new tools will the universal 
goal of improved food safety be achieved. 
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Conclusion 
This paper sought to answer the question:  What factors most affected the difficulty 
experienced during the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak and subsequent investigation, and are 
these factors representative of larger problems in the food safety system?  While the Salmonella 
Saintpaul outbreak was unusual in many aspects and it would be foolhardy to make sweeping 
generalizations and reforms on the basis of one abnormal event, this investigation highlighted 
factors in need of improvement among all layers of government that must be addressed for our 
food safety system to prevent or minimize future outbreaks.  Three factors that emerged included 
(1) delayed response due to discrepancies in available resources and expertise at state and local 
levels, (2) inadequate communication between agencies and stakeholders, and (3) poor 
traceability capabilities.  Many other topics (e.g., increased resources for the FDA, risk-based 
inspections and testing, equal food safety standards for imported foods and the use of GAPs, and 
third party auditors) have come to the forefront in connection to the Salmonella Saintpaul 
outbreak; while the authors acknowledge the importance of these concepts, they are beyond the 
scope of this discussion.   
The U.S. food safety system is, indeed, confronted by many formidable challenges. The 
emergence of new pathogens such as Escherichia coli O157:H7, the economic burden placed on 
the American public by repeated foodborne outbreaks, and the massive increase in produce 
imported from foreign countries with questionable (or nonexistent) food safety statutes demand 
an especially vigilant food safety system33.  As the amount of fresh produce consumed by 
Americans continues to increase, lessons learned from the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak need to 
be applied to the current food safety system to try and prevent similar situations. 
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While several groups investigated whether errors may or may not have been made in the 
recent Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak, many people in multiple organizations at many different 
levels worked hard to identify the source of contamination and protect the American public.  In 
one sense, the food safety system succeeded as the source of contamination was determined.  
However, the three factors responsible for much of the difficulty experienced in the Salmonella 
Saintpaul outbreak do, indeed, signal wider problems within the food safety system, and any 
legislative revision of the U.S. food safety system must address these factors.    
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Table 1   Sources and types of publically available data used to investigate factors potentially contributing to the complexity of the 2008 Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak and 
subsequent investigation. 
Category Source of data Type Ref. 
Federal  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Dr. Lonnie King)  Congressional testimony  4 
 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  Publication  8, 13 
 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  Public communication  10, 11, 12 
 Food and Drug Administration (Dr. David Acheson)  Congressional testimony  3, 9 
 Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General  Report  32 
 House of Representatives (Rep. Adam Putnam)  Congressional testimony  36 
 House of Representatives (Rep. Diana DeGette)  Congressional testimony  35 
State and local  California Dept. of Food & Agriculture (Mr. A.G. Kawamura)  Congressional testimony  7 
 Florida Dept. of Agriculture (Mr. Charles Bronson)  Congressional testimony  18 
 Minnesota Dept. of Health (Dr. Kirk Smith)  Congressional testimony  14 
 Tennessee Dept. of Health/Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (Dr. Timothy 
Jones) 
Congressional testimony  16 
Industry Ace Tomato Company & Delta Prepack (Mr. Parker Booth)  Congressional testimony  32 
 California Tomato Farmers (Mr. Edward Beckman)  Congressional testimony  31 
 Florida Tomato Exchange (Mr. Reginald Brown)  Congressional testimony  20 
 National Restaurant Assoc. (Dr. Donna Garren)  Congressional testimony  21 
 Produce Marketing Assoc. (Mr. Bryan Silbermann)  Congressional testimony   34 
 Western Growers (Mr. Henry Giclas)  Congressional testimony  22, 24 
Alliance for a Stronger FDA (Mr. William Hubbard)  Congressional testimony  33 Non-governmental 
organization 
Center for Science in the Public Interest  Publication  1 
 Consumers Union (Ms. Jean Halloran)  Congressional testimony  30 
 Pew Charitable Trust: Produce Safety Project  Publication  26 
 Trust for America’s Health (Mr. Jeffery Levi)  Congressional testimony  37 
Academic Georgetown University (Dr. Michael Taylor)  Congressional testimony  2, 17 
 Postharvest Technology Research & Information Center, University of California Davis (Dr. 
James Gorny) 
Congressional testimony  23 
 Environmental Health Sciences, School of Public Health, University of Minnesota (Dr. Michael 
Osterholm, Dr. Craig Hedberg and Dr. John Besser) 
Congressional testimony  15 
Table 2 Timeline of events associated with the 2008 Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak in produce.6,10-12 
Date Timeline of Events 
May 22 New Mexico Dept. of Health notifies CDC of 4 confirmed cases of S. Saintpaul 
May 23 Texas and Colorado report additional S. Saintpaul cases with matching PFGE patterns. 
Multistate investigation led by New Mexico Dept. of Health begins. 
May 31 New Mexico Dept. of Health announces link between S. Saintpaul and red plum, red 
Roma and red round tomatoes. 
June 1 FDA begins traceback for suspected tomatoes. 
June 3 CDC announces a warning for the consumption of red plum, red Roma or red round 
tomatoes by high-risk individuals in New Mexico or Texas. 
CDC is asked to assume a coordinating role in the multistate outbreak investigation. 
June 7 FDA issues a consumer advisory against consumption of red plum, red Roma or red 
round tomatoes. 
June 18 Texas issues invitation for an Epi-Aid from CDC to investigate outbreaks associated with 
Mexican style restaurants. 
June 30-
July7 
Case-control study in Texas implicates salsa made with jalapeño peppers and canned 
tomatoes. 
July 1 Minnesota reports outbreak of S. Saintpaul associated with jalapeño pepper consumption. 
July 9 CDC announces a consumer warning for the consumption of jalapeño peppers by high 
risk individuals. 
July 17 FDA lifts consumer advisory against red plum, red Roma and red round tomatoes 
currently on the market. 
July 21 FDA and CDC announce outbreak strain has been isolated from a jalapeño pepper sample 
in Texas. 
FDA and CDC issue warning against consumption of fresh jalapeño peppers. 
Late July Contaminated jalapeño pepper sample is traced back to a suspected farm (Farm A) in 
Mexico which also grows serrano peppers and Roma tomatoes. 
FDA finds matching isolates from a serrano pepper and water sediment samples on a 
neighboring farm (Farm B) in Mexico. 
Farm A and Farm B share a common packing facility in Mexico. 
August 28 CDC updates website to reflect the apparent end of the outbreak. 
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